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A quick search at Findlaw indicates that there are at least 100 United States Supreme Court cases that mention the words "Declaration of Independence" somewhere in the dicta of that opinion.
Yet, not one single case can be found where the authority for the holding in that case was the Declaration of independence.
There is not a single case that was "specifically decided on the Declaration of Independence or its provisions." No decision has turned or can turn on the Declaration of Independence itself.
In Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79 (1901), the Court stated:
The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words: "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. "While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government."
Listed below is a small cross section of those cases.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796)
It is conceded that a debt was due from the Defendants to the Plaintiff, at the commencement of the revolutionary war; and it has been decided, in the case of Georgia versus Brailsford, ant. p. 1. that although the state had a power to suspend the payment of such a debt, during the continuance of hostilities, yet that the creditor's right to recover it, revived as an incident and consequence of the peace. There is, indeed, no controverting the general right of a belligerent power to confiscate the property of its enemy, in ordinary cases; though the modern policy of nations abstains from the exercise of that right, in respect to debts. Vatt. B. 3. s. 77. p. 484. But the relative situation of Great Britain and her colonies was of a peculiar nature, widely different from the situation of the Grecian, or Roman colonies; and, therefore, requiring a new and appropriate rule of action. At the time of the revolution, the creditor and debtor were members of the same society; subjects of the same empire. Had they belonged, originally, to distinct, independent states, both would have anticipated, in the case of a war, an exercise of the power of confiscation; but the event of a civil contest could not be reasonably contemplated, nor provided for. We find, therefore, upon the law of positive authority, as well as upon a principle of natural justice, that even the declaration of independence was deemed to have no obligatory operation upon any inhabitant of the United States, who did not choose, voluntarily to remain in the country, or to take an [3 U.S. 199, 208] oath of allegiance, to some member of the confederation. 1 Dall. Rep. 53. On the declaration of independence, the American debtor might choose his political party, but he could not dissolve his obligation to his British creditor; and if he had no power to dissolve it himself, it follows that he could not communicate such a power, to the society of which he became a member. Vatt. Pr. Dis. s. 5. 11. Besides, there are, certainly, a variety of cases, to which the rigorous power of confiscation cannot, and ought not to extend. Suppose a contract is formed in a neutral country, between subjects of two belligerent powers, the debt thus incurred could hardly be the object of confiscation. An action, it has been adjudged, may be maintained on a ransom bill, even during the continuance of the war. Doug. 19. And. in general, it may be stated, that capitulations, made in time of war, though they embrace the security of debts, as well as other property, must be held sacred. Vatt. B. 3. s. 263. 264. p. 612. 613.
I would premise that this objection against the right of the Virginia legislature to confiscate British property, (and especially debts) is made on the part of British subjects, and after the treaty of peace, and not by the government of the United States. I would also remark, that the law of Virginia was made after the declaration of independence by Virginia, and also by Congress; and several years before the Confederation of the United States, which, although agreed to by Congress on the 15th of November, 1777, and assented to by ten states, in 1778, was only finally completed and ratified on the 1st of March, 1781.
I am of opinion that the exclusive right of confiscating, during the war, all and every species of British property, within the territorial limits of Virginia, resided only in the Legislature of that commonwealth. I shall hereafter consider whether the law of the 20th of October 1777, operated to confiscate or extinguish [3 U.S. 199, 223] British debts, contracted before the war. It is worthy of remembrance, that Delegates and Representatives were elected, by the people of the several counties and corporations of Virginia, to meet in general convention, for the purpose of framing a NEW government, by the authority of the people only; and that the said Convention met on the 6th of May, and continued in session until the 5th of July 1776; and, in virtue of their delegated power, established a constitution, or form of government, to regulate and determine by whom, and in what manner, the authority of the people of Virginia was thereafter to be executed. As the people of that country were the genuine source and fountain of all power, that could be rightfully exercised within its limits; they had therefore an unquestionable right to grant it to whom they pleased, and under what restrictions or limitations they thought proper. The people of Virginia, by their Constitution or fundamental law, granted and delegated all their Supreme civil power to a Legislature, and Executive, and a Judiciary; The first to make; the second to execute; and the last to declare or expound, the laws of the Commonwealth. This abolition of the Old Government, and this establishment of a new one was the highest act of power, that any people can exercise. From the moment the people of Virginia exercised this power, all dependence on, and connection with Great Britain absolutely and forever ceased; and no formal declaration of Independence was necessary, although a decent respect for the opinions of mankind required a declaration of the causes, which impelled the separation; and was proper to give notice of the event to the nations of Europe. I hold it as unquestionable, that the Legislature of Virginia established as I have stated by the authority of the people, was for ever thereafter invested with the supreme and sovereign power of the state, and with authority to make any Laws in their discretion, to affect the lives, liberties, and property of all the citizens of that Commonwealth, with this exception only, that such laws should not be repugnant to the Constitution, or fundamental law, which could be subject only to the control of the body of the nation, in cases not to be defined, and which will always provide for themselves. The legislative power of every nation can only be restrained by its own constitution: and it is the duty of its courts of justice not to question the validity of any law made in pursuance of the constitution. There is no question but the act of the Virginia Legislature (of the 20th of October 1777) was within the authority granted to them by the people of that country; and this being admitted, it is a necessary result, that the law is obligatory on the courts of Virginia, and, in my opinion, on the courts of the United States. If Virginia as a sovereign State, violated the ancient or modern [3 U.S. 199, 224] law of nations, in making the law of the 20th of October 1777, she was answerable in her political capacity to the British nation, whose subjects have been injured in consequence of that law. Suppose a general right to confiscate British property, is admitted to be in Congress, and Congress had confiscated all British property within the United States, including private debts: would it be permitted to contend in any court of the United States, that Congress had no power to confiscate such debts, by the modern law of nations? If the right is conceded to be in Congress, it necessarily follows, that she is the judge of the exercise of the right, as to the extent, mode, and manner. The same reasoning is strictly applicable to Virginia, is considered a sovereign nation; provided she had not delegated such power to Congress, before the making of the law of October 1777, which I will hereafter consider.
From the 4th of July, 1776, the American States were de facto, as well as de jure, in the possession and actual exercise of all the rights of independent governments. On the 6th of February, 1778, the King of France entered into a treaty of alliance with the United States; and on the 8th of Oct. 1782, a treaty of Amity and Commerce was concluded between the United States and the States General of the United Provinces. I have ever [3 U.S. 199, 225] considered it as the established doctrine of the United States, that their independence originated from, and commenced with, the declaration of Congress, on the 4th of July, 1776; and that no other period can be fixed on for its commencement; and that all laws made by the legislatures of the several states, after the declaration of independence, were the laws of sovereign and independent governments.
That the creditor and debtor were members of the same empire, when the debt was contracted, cannot (in my opinion) distinguish the case, for the same reasons. A most arbitrary claim was made by the parliament of Great Britain, to make laws to bind the people of America, in all cases whatsoever, and the King of Great Britain, with the approbation of parliament, employed, not only the national forces, but hired foreign mercenaries to compel submission to this absurd claim of omnipotent power. The resistance against this claim was just, and independence became necessary; and the people of the United States announced to the people of Great Britain, "that they would hold them, as the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace, friends." On the declaration of independence, it was in the option of any subject of Great Britain, to join their brethren in America, or to remain subjects of Great Britain. Those who joined us were entitled to all the benefits of our freedom and independence; but those who elected to continue subjects of Great Britain, exposed themselves to any loss, that might arise therefrom. By their adhering to the enemies of the United States, they voluntarily became parties to the injustice and oppression of the British government; and they also contributed to carry on the war, and to enslave their former fellow citizens. As members of the British government, from their own choice, they became personally answerable for the conduct of that government, of which they remained a part; and their property, wherever found (on land or water) became liable to confiscation. On this ground, Congress on the 24th of July, 1776, confiscated any British property taken on the seas. See 2 Ruth. Inst. lib. 2.c.9.s.13.p.531.559. Vatt.[3 U.S. 199, 226] lib.2.c.7.s.81.& c. 18.s.344.lib.3. c,5.s.74.& c. 9. s. 161 & 193.
The Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841)
This case is not only one of deep interest in itself, as affecting the destiny of the unfortunate Africans whom I represent, but it involves considerations deeply affecting our national character in the eyes of the whole civilized world, as well as questions of power on the part of the government of the United States, which are regarded with anxiety and alarm by a large portion of our citizens. It presents, for the first time, the question, whether that government, which was established for the promotion of justice, which was founded on the great principles of the revolution, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, can, consistently with the genius of our institutions, become a party to proceedings for the enslavement of human beings cast upon our shores, and found, in the condition of freemen, within the territorial limits of a free and sovereign state?
The 6th article of the Spanish treaty has received a judicial construction in the case of The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 284, where it was decided, that the obligation assumed is simply that of protecting belligerent vessels from capture, within our jurisdiction. It can have no application, therefore, to a case like the present. The 9th article of that treaty provides, "that all ships and merchandize, of what nature soever, which shall be rescued out of the hands of pirates or robbers, on the high seas, shall be brought into some port of either state, and shall be delivered to the custody of the officers of that port, in order to be taken care of, and restored entire to the true proprietors, as soon as due and sufficient proof shall be made concernng the property thereof." To render this clause of the treaty applicable to the case under consideration, it must be assumed, that under the term "merchandize" the contracting parties intended to include slaves; and that slaves, themselves the recent victims of piracy, who by a successful revolt, have achieved their deliverance from slavery, on the high seas, and have availed themselves of the means of escape of which they have thus acquired the possession, are to be deemed "pirates and robbers," "from whose hands" such "merchandize has been rescued." It is believed, that such a construction of the words of the treaty is not in accordance with the rules of interpretation which ought to govern our courts; and that when there is no special reference to human beings, as property, who are not acknowledged as such by the law or comity of nations, generally, but only by the municipal laws of the particular nations which tolerate slavery, it cannot be presumed, that the contracting parties intended to include them under the general term "merchandize." As has already been remarked, it may well be doubted, [40 U.S. 518, 556] whether such a stipulation would be within the treaty-making power of the United States. It is to be remembered, that the government of the United States is based on the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence, by the congress of 1776; "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that to secure these rights, governments are instituted."
The ninth article of the Spanish treaty was copied from the 16th article of the treaty with France, concluded in 1778, in the midst of the war of the revolution, in which the great principles of liberty proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence were vindicated by our fathers. By "merchandize rescued from pirates," the contracting parties must have had in view property, which it would be the duty of the public ships of the United States to rescue from its unlawful possessors. Because, if it is taken from those who are rightfully in possession, the capture would be wrongful, and it would be our duty to restore it. But is it a duty which our naval officers owe to a nation tolerating the slave-trade, to subdue for their kidnappers the revolted victims of their cruelty? Could the people of the United States, consistently with their principles as a nation, have ever consented to a treaty stipulation which would impose such a duty on our naval officers? a duty which would drive every citizen of a free state from the service of his country? Has our government, which has been so cautious as not to oblige itself to surrender the most atrocious criminals, who have sought an asylum in the United States, bound itself, under the term "merchandize," to seize and surrender fugitive slaves?
Thurlow v. Com of Mass, 46 U.S. 504 (1847)
They admitted that an act of a State, to come in conflict with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce, when not exercised, must of itself be an exercise of that power; but maintained, that any law pertaining to the mere police of a State might come in conflict with a commercial regulation of Congress; and, if it did, must, so far as it did, yield to the law of Congress, as the supreme law of the land, when passed in pursuance of the constitution. They were not aware, until the doctrine had been boldly advanced by the counsel for Massachusetts, in the preceding case,-tried with this by order of the court,-that it had been "a growing opinion," and still less, that by the decision of this court in New York v. Miln, 11 Pet., 139, 141, it had become "the settled law" of this court and of the land, that in all such cases of conflict the rule of the constitution was reversed, and that the law of Congress became subject to the law of the State, as to the supreme law of the land, and that the clause of the constitution asserting the supremacy of the constitution, and of the laws and treaties of the United States made under it, applied only to the case of concurrent powers; nor did they so understand that case. They maintained that the doctrine thus announced was little short of absurdity, since it admitted the supremacy of the law of Congress in the case of concurrent powers,-in the exercise of which the governments of the States and the government of the United States enjoyed, as it were, a joint empire, and where, from the very fact that the powers were concurrent, they could never, in a constitutional sense, be said to conflict, and so there was no room for the supremacy in question,-and denied the supremacy of the United States in the legitimate exercise of its exclusive powers, making the United States the slave of the States in its own exclusive dominions, under a constitution which declared, without limitation or reserve, that its just power should be supreme, not only over the laws, but even the constitutions, of the States. Upon this question they appealed from conservative Massachusetts to democratic Virginia, and cited the 44th Paper of the Federalist, p. 183, Gideon's edition, in which Mr. Madison, in commenting upon the clause of the constitution in question, concludes his defence against the only objection that was made to it-that it rendered the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States supreme over the constitutions of the States- with this statement of the [46 U.S. 504, 545] result if this supremacy had not been given:-"In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members." In this case, a supremacy over the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States was claimed for every, even the most petty, police law of a State, or even a town or city, when that constitution and those laws and treaties were made supreme over the constitution of the State by which, or under the authority of which, the police law was passed. They commented upon the case of New York v. Miln, for the purpose of showing that the general language there used by Mr. Justice Barbour in delivering the opinion of the court, from which the strange doctrine in question had been inferred, should, according to the rule in this respect laid down by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 399, be restrained to the case before the court, which, by the decision of the court, involved no conflict of the powers of the government of the State of New York with those of the government of the United States, and, by the illustrations given of the meaning of the language, could be fairly applied only to cases where no conflict existed. Upon this point, they cited also the opinions of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, and of Mr. Justice McLean, in the subsequent case of Groves et al. v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 505, 509, members of the court at the time the opinion in New York v. Miln was delivered, and concurring in that opinion, for the purpose of showing that they could not have understood the language in question in the sense contended for.
(Mr. Justice Wayne here declared his entire dissent from the general opinions expressed in the language in question, and even declared that he had no recollection that such language was in the opinion of the court in that case at the time it received his concurrence.)
They concluded upon this point, that if any persons really held the doctrine in question, upon the supposition that it was necessary for the maintenance of certain peculiar institutions of some of the States, which, though guaranteed by the constitution, were at war with its whole spirit, as well as with the principles of the Declaration of Independence, which the constitution carried out as far as it could consistently with the existing condition of the country, they were guilty of "a blunder,"-in the opinion of a great but unprincipled politician, in such matters, always worse than "a crime." The clauses in the constitution guaranteeing these institutions were an anomaly in it. It was better, then, to treat those institutions and every thing fairly relating to them as anomalous,-to be governed by peculiar rules,-than, by converting an anomaly into a general rule, to [46 U.S. 504, 546] pervert the whole spirit, and invert the whole order, of the constitution, and, by thus stripping the general government of all its powers, deprive the States, and especially the smaller States, of all the rights and protection guaranteed by the United States. They who were willing, and all sensible people were, to stand by the compromises of the constitution, would do much to redeem the pledge thus given for them; but it was both unjust and impolitic to require this of them.
They came, then, to the only real question in the cause, whether the law of Rhode Island in question was in conflict with the tariff law, as it was called, of 1842.
In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted. But there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation cannot infringe. It may prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert the rights themselves. I speak now of the rights of citizens of any free government. Granting for the present that the citizens of one government cannot claim the privileges of citizens in another government; that prior to the union of our North American States the citizens of one State could not claim the privileges of citizens in another State; or, that after the union was formed the citizens of the United States, as such, could not claim the privileges of citizens in any particular State; yet the citizens of each of the States and the citizens of the United States would be entitled to certain privileges and immunities as citizens, at the hands of their own government-privileges and immunities which their own governments respectively would be bound to respect and maintain. In this free country, the people of which inherited certain traditionary rights and privileges from their ancestors, citizenship means something. It has certain privileges and immunities attached to it which the government, whether restricted by express or implied limitations, cannot take away or impair. It may do so temporarily by force, but it cannot do so by right. And these privileges and immunities attach as well to citizenship of the United States as to citizenship of the States.
The people of this country brought with them to its shores the rights of Englishmen; the rights which had been wrested from English sovereigns at various periods of the nation's history. One of these fundamental rights was expressed in these words, found in Magna Charta: "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him or condemn [83 U.S. 36, 115] him but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." English constitutional writers expound this article as rendering life, liberty, and property inviolable, except by due process of law. This is the very right which the plaintiffs in error claim in this case. Another of these rights was that of habeas corpus, or the right of having any invasion of personal liberty judicially examined into, at once, by a competent judicial magistrate. Blackstone classifies these fundamental rights under three heads, as the absolute rights of individuals, to wit: the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property. And of the last he says: "The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land."
The privileges and immunities of Englishmen were established and secured by long usage and by various acts of Parliament. But it may be said that the Parliament of England has unlimited authority, and might repeal the laws which have from time to time been enacted. Theoretically this is so, but practically it is not. England has no written constitution, it is true; but it has an unwritten one, resting in the acknowledged, and frequently declared, privileges of Parliament and the people, to violate which in any material respect would produce a revolution in an hour. A violation of one of the fundamental principles of that constitution in the Colonies, namely, the principle that recognizes the property of the people as their own, and which, therefore, regards all taxes for the support of government as gifts of the people through their representatives, and regards taxation without representation as subversive of free government, was the origin of our own revolution.
This, it is true, was the violation of a political right; but personal rights were deemed equally sacred, and were claimed by the very first Congress of the Colonies, assembled in 1774, as the undoubted inheritance of the people of this country; and the Declaration of Independence, which [83 U.S. 36, 116] was the first political act of the American people in their independent sovereign capacity, lays the foundation of our National existence upon this broad proposition: "That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of freemen, asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. These are the fundamental rights which can only be taken away by due process of law, and which can only be interfered with, or the enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every free government.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)
It is contended on the part of the petitioners that the ordinances for violations of which they are severally sentenced to imprisonment are void on their face, as being within the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, and, in the alternative, if not so, that they are void by reason of their administration, operating unequally, so as to punish in the present petitioners what is permitted to others as lawful, without any distinction of circumstances,-an unjust and illegal discrimination, it is claimed, which, though not made expressly by the ordinances, is made possible by them.
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed [118 U.S. 356, 370] to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere administration, the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion, or by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts bill of rights, the government of the commonwealth "may be a government of laws and not of men." For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. CO. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897)
But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. The equal protection demanded by the fourteenth amendment forbids this. No language is more worthy of frequent and thoughtful consideration than these words of Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for this court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S. Sup. Ct. 1064, 1071: "When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power." The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, [165 U.S. 150, 160] that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government.
Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79 (1901)
Mr. Justice Brewer, after making the above statement, delivered the following opinion, and announced the conclusion and judgment of the court:
In Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159 , 41 S. L. ed. 666, 669, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255, 258, in which was presented solely the question of classification, we said, referring to many cases, both state and national:
"But arbitrary selection can never be justified by calling it classification. The equal protection demanded by the 14th Amendment forbids this. No language is more worthy of frequent and thoughtful consideration than these words of Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for this court, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 30 S. L. ed. 220, 226, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064, 1071: "When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power." The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of government in these words: "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence. No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of rights which is the foundation of free government."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
(a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had been ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his. 3 [427 U.S. 495, 500]
The Court has repeatedly held that distinctions which disfavor illegitimates simply because they are illegitimate are invalid. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 ; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 . However irrational it may be to burden innocent children because their parents did not marry, illegitimates are nonetheless a traditionally disfavored class in our society. Because of that tradition of disfavor the Court should be especially vigilant in examining any classification which involves illegitimacy. For a traditional classification is more likely to be used without pausing to consider its justification than is a newly created classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction may have no rational relationship - other than pure prejudicial discrimination 3 - to the [427 U.S. 495, 521] stated purpose for which the classification is being made.
[ Footnote 3 ] Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth. "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 . From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes of the law. The Declaration of Independence states:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."
And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S. Const., Art. I, 9, [427 U.S. 495, 521] cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
These are not, it must be stressed, cases like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , in which this Court held that, in the sphere of public education, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws required that race not be treated as a relevant factor. A segregated school system is not invalid because its operation is coercive; it is invalid simply because our Constitution presupposes that men are created equal, and that therefore racial differences cannot provide a valid basis for governmental action. Accommodation of religious differences on the part of the State, however, is not only permitted but required by that same Constitution.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the paternalism that [Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence ("We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness").
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