This case also involved an attack against God and Christianity, but unlike the previous cases, these attacks had been published. Not surprisingly, the publisher claimed "freedom of the press" in his defense. The legal indictment against him was for "willfully blaspheming the holy name of God" and for a public disavowal of Christ. The indictment revealed his published statements:

"The Universalists believe in a god which I do not; but believe that their god, with all his moral attributes ... is nothing more than a chimera of their own imagination"; "Universalists believe in Christ, which I do not; but believe that the whole story concerning him is ... a fable and a fiction... "; etc.... the language was ... a willful denial of the existence of God . . . so as to bring it within the statute.

An interesting term was used in the indictment, a term unknown to contemporary courts when used in connection with God:

The defendant admitted the writing and publishing of the libel.

"Libel" is a familiar term when used concerning other persons. It means to intentionally declare things about them that are false and would publicly injure their reputation or expose them to public ridicule. Such attacks on individuals were, and still are, illegal and subject to litigation. Yet, in previous years, attacks on God and Christ fell. under the same laws constructed to protect reputations: the laws against libel.

The defendant explained to the court the reasons his conviction should be overturned. First, he claimed he did not deny a belief in God; he was a pantheist and only denied the belief in a God; he felt that everything was god. Therefore, he asserted no law had been broken. Second, he argued that the law under which he was convicted had been superseded and overturned by the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom. Lastly, he believed the laws against blasphemy were a violation of the freedom of the press. He felt the Constitution:

Guarantees to me the strict right of propagating my sentiments, by way of argument or discussion, on religion or any other subject.

The court addressed the defendant's first argument, that he had broken no law:

The statute, on which the question arises is as follows: "That if any person shall willfully blaspheme the holy name of God, by denying, cursing, or contumaciously reproaching God, his creation, government, or final judging of the world," &c. . . .

In general, blasphemy [that is, libel against God] may be described, as consisting in speaking evil of the Deity . . . to alienate the minds of others from the love and reverence of God. It is purposely using words concerning God ... to impair and destroy the reverence, respect, and confidence due to him... . It is a wilful and malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence of God by denying his existence, or his attributes as an intelligent creator, governor and judge of men, and to prevent their having confidence in him.

The court reviewed the history of blasphemy laws in America from 1646 until the then current 1782 version of the law. After summarizing the intent of each of those laws and establishing their legal validity, the Chief Justice upheld the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of blasphemy and libel. Having disposed of the defendant's first position, the court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the law:

But another ground for anesting the judgment, and one apparently most relied on and urged by the defendant, is, that this statute itself is repugnant to the constitution ... and therefore wholly void. . . . [This law] was passed very soon after the adoption of the constitution, and no doubt, many members of the convention which framed the constitution, were members of the legislature which passed this law.

The court showed how that Massachusetts laws against blasphemy were compatible with similar provisions in the constitutions of other states whose constitutions also granted religious freedom, and thus were constitutionally valid laws:

In New Hampshire, the constitution of which State has a similar declaration of [religious] rights, the open denial of the being and existence of God or of the Supreme Being is prohibited by statute, and declared to be blasphemy.

In Vermont, with a similar declaration of rights, a statute was passed in 1797, by which it was enacted, that if any person shall publicly deny the being and existence of God or the Supreme Being, or shall contumaciously reproach his providence and government, he shall be deemed a disturber of the peace and tranquility of the State, and an offender against the good morals and manners of society, and shall be punishable by fine....

The State of Maine also, having adopted the same constitutional provision with that of Massachusetts, in her declaration of rights, in respect to religious freedom, immediately after the adoption of the constitution reenacted, the Massachusetts statute against blasphemy. . . .

In New York the universal toleration of all religious professions and sentiments, is secured in the most ample manner. It is declared in the constitution . . . that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship, without discrimination or preference, shall for ever be allowed in this State to all mankind. . . . Notwithstanding this constitutional declaration carrying the doctrine of unlimited toleration as far as the peace and safety of any community will allow, the courts have decided that blasphemy was a crime at common law and was not abrogated by the constitution [People v. Ruggles].

The court lastly addressed the "freedom of the press" issue raised by the defendant and concluded that there was much that could not be protected by "freedom of the press":

According to the argument .. . every act, however injurious or criminal, which can be committed by the use of language, may be committed . . . if such language is printed. Not only therefore would the article in question become a general license for scandal, calumny and falsehood against individuals, institutions and governments, in the form of publication ... but all incitation to treason, assassination, and all other crimes however atrocious, if conveyed in printed language, would be dispunishable.